Air France crash

[ToddK]

When I converted to the Airbus, I came off of 12 years of flying Boeing 707's, 747-200's and 747-400's, as well as 10 years of military flying before that, so the change to the Airbus set up was quite big for me. However, the side stick is quite nice to fly with. It did take me a little time to get used to having no control feed back, however there is no need to trim the controls on the Airbus. Just set the attitude required and let the stick go, it will stay there. Small control inputs are required, I find it a lot like the control inputs we used in close formation flying I did in the military. The control system is good and does work well, but it does make a lot more sense when the design philosophy behind it is explained to you.

As for the non moving thrust levers, again that took a little while to get used to. But again, once the design philosophy is explained, it makes sense. When the autothrust system is engaged, it works well, so there is no need for the thrust levers to move. If you want to know what the thrust is doing, there are clear trend lines on the EPR/N1 gauges. And if you disconnect the auto thrust, the thrust levers operate in normal fashion. Personally, if the conditions at landing are anything other calm wind, I prefer to fly a manual thrust approach, as I feel I can have better control over the airspeed and thrust that way. However, that is just a personal preference, a hangover to my background flying I guess. But the Airbus autothrust system is good and capable.

[Kerry j]

I agree about the side stick Todd, I've flown aircraft that have them and it's really easy to get accustomed to. First time I flew a Cirrus, I was comfortable with in within a few minutes.

The thing I have a hard time with is the lack of feedback from both the side stick and throttles in the A320 when there's a problem with the data the pilots have to use to fly the plane. How are they supposed to keep the damn thing in the air when the data system is compromised and they're IFR?

[cjetmech]

Heres an article I just read in aviationweek http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/awst/2011/06/06/AW_06_06_2011_p36-330706.xml&channel=comm   
 Pretty interesting because it says at one point they recovered and got their instruments back but put it into a stall again. I'm a tech so I dont know but can one of the pilots on here tell me if stalls are ever practiced in the sim. It seems like they are not.

[ToddK]

I do recall once practicing a fully developed stall and recovery in the simulator during my initial A330 conversion. But nothing since then, although we do practice recoveries from stall warnings. The stall warning is still short of a fully developed stall.

[cjetmech]

Wow thanks for the info Todd. I had always thought upset recovery was part of sim training. I wonder if after these recent incidents, (especially Colgan) company's / or the feds start requiring this type of stuff as part of a type rating?

[ToddK]

In the company I work for, we do our licence and instrument rating renewals every 6 months in the simulator. That involves 2 sim sessions each time, a recurrent training sessions and then the actual rating renewal. In the recurrent training session, they usually  throw in anything topical or something the safety department has highlighted as worth practicing. In the past it has been things like volcanic ash encounters, wind shear or visual approaches. I dare say in the next session or so we will be practicing upset recoveries with instrument failures.

[BarryB]

The company I work for has no sim training for upset recovery although I understand that that is being considered.
I really don't know how it can't NOT be done actually. Colgan air and Air France were two that should have been recoverable. There was also the US air crash in 1994 with a full-over rudder jam that was subsequently trained for in the B737 fleets of the world.
easy to say from here though. I wasn't there and I'm not a pilot. I just fix 'em!

[BarryB]

http://atwonline.com/operations-maintenance/article/limiting-loss-control-0401

[jayb]

The latest report on the Air France crash is summarized here:

http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/article/latest-report-on-af447-crash-calls-for-new-training-and-flight-data-30753/

It sounds like malfunctioning equipment created a situation where the pilots weren't sure what was going on.  The BEA claims the situation was "salvageable", implying pilot error, but Air France seems to disagree, specifically citing the on/off nature of the stall warning as something that confused the crew, and kept them from taking proper actions.  In any case, it sounds like the pilots for this aircraft will be getting more training on manually flying the airplane, and the airplane itself will be getting an angle of attack indicator.  I'm kind of surprised that an angle of attack indicator isn't already installed on the plane...

[ToddK]

The A330/340 aircraft do have 3 angle of attack sensors, however there is no direct reading of AOA displayed in the cockpit. The AOA readings are used by the flight management, guidance and envelope computers. The only indication the pilot has of AOA is, under normal flight law, when the AOA is greater than a protection limit value. This is indicated by the airspeed reducing into a low threshold band, and also autopilot disconnecting and the thrust increasing to TOGA. However, in the case of the AF incident, if the airspeed readout was incorrect, the flight controls may not have been in normal law, so a lot of the built in protection would not have been available. But even without any AOA indication, there still would have been stall indications such as airframe buffet, not to mention an unusually high nose up pitch shown on the attitude indicator.

It is unfortunate to read this report as it is really starting to sound like it was a recoverable situation that was badly mishandled and led to the death of so many people. Whether the airline it self or the aircraft manufacturer is also to blame, that's for the courts to decide. But regardless of whatever systemic causes will be blamed for this accident occuring, when the shit hits the fan, it's the 2 pilots up the front who have the responsibility of recovering the situation and safely landing the aircraft. So it annoys me when airline management claim that pilots are glorified, over paid bus drivers and they try to cut our wages and conditions. Sure, they can hire guys who will work for peanuts. But wouldn't the travelling public want the most experienced, best qualified crew flying their aircraft. I know I would if my family were travelling by air.

Sorry about my rant there, but it is something that gets on my nerves. These days we see so many low cost carriers all trying to compete, and they go to all sorts of measures to reduce operating costs. Most of the public see low, low air fares and think it's great. But when their flights get delayed or cancelled and they get stranded, or worst case, there is a safety incident, then the same public complains about it. But it's the same as buying car parts - you buy the cheapest part now, it may not be that cheap in the long run.

Okay, I'll get off my soapbox now and back on topic...

[jayb]

Thanks for the clarification on the angle of attack indicator.  As my friend who flies the A320 says, pilots should get paid for the responsibility that they take when flying the plane, and that is basically putting the lives of the passengers in the pilot's hands.  I don't  understand the rationale for chopping pilot's salaries either; it will only attract less qualified individuals to the field 

[billballinger]

I am not an expert, but I wondered about something.  If the tubes themselves were in a stall, such as an atmospheric vacuum, could they possibly supply data that is out of range and disregarded by by instrumentation and flight systems? A vacuum would essentially be like putting tape over them, and if the barometric pressure and position of the tubes were to come together in a certain alignment, could they possibly become a vacuum situation that would render them unreliable?  I am postulating that if this critical element were in error, everything down the line would be a domino effect of computer errors that would compromise the integrity of the entire flight system, and information that the pilot is receiving instrumentally.  It would not necessarily be pilot error, but instrument failure. 

I am looking forward to hearing more also.       

[WConley]

Here's a new article that summarizes the events in the cockpit.  Gripping read!!

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/crashes/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877

- Bill

[Kerry j]

Hard to imagine holding back-pressure on the yoke for so long and not have a clue what you're doing. Seems like a serious flaw in the training of that co-pilot. What he did is completely foreign to any flight training I've had or heard of; it is just drilled into you to keep the nose down and the co-pilot held the nose up for more than 3 minutes.

Another thing this points out is the need for standard electric or vacuum driven "steam" attitude indicator and gauges as backup to the flat screens & electronic systems the industry has become ennaoroed with.

Very sad that 228 people had to die because of such a basic mistake in understanding of their situation and application of proper input.

[machoneman]

Thanks for posting that PM article. Very sad indeed that at so many points of possible intervention the pilot, co-pilots and their training let down, fatally, so many passengers. I wonder too if the cockpit crew 'grew up' as I'll call it around light planes where manual flight controls, spins, stalls, etc. could have been part of a training regime on 'what to do if'. Bet they didn't!